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A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may
be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally
activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford
moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because
binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more
importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and
support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record
participants’ (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values.
Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close
others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values—an effect that
replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two
preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that
people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or
imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different
moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of
others can affect moral thinking.
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n the course of daily life, people are apt to have a variety of
social encounters, each demanding a set of contextually
appropriate behaviors. For example, playing with one’s child is
likely to entail a very different set of actions than asking one’s
boss for a raise. As a result, successfully navigating the social
world depends on people’s ability to ﬂexibly adapt their behavior
according to various relational needs1. One cognitive tool people
may use to help them do this is a set of moral values. Morals are
standards for social living that provide people with guidance on
how to treat each other2–4. As such, they help direct and constrain behavior in the context of different relationships5. Supporting this view, recent empirical and theoretical evidence
suggests morality plays a critical role in many aspects of social
life, including promoting cooperation6, helping people pursue
shared goals7, regulating social relationships8, and fostering group
cohesion9.
Recent theoretical advances in moral psychology suggest that
human values may be divided into two distinct sets10,11, each
serving a different function. The ﬁrst set, called “binding” values,
govern people’s behavior in local groups and communities. Based
on tenets of “coalitional psychology,”12 these values help regulate
behavior in cooperative settings13 and include loyalty, which
encourages the subordination of individual motivations to the
collective14; authority, which promotes the respect of laws, leaders, and traditions15; and purity, which helps to protect people
and communities against potentially harmful pathogens16. The
other set consists of “individualizing” values. Built on the “ethic of
autonomy,”13 these are concerned with ensuring personal rights
and freedoms17 and include values of fairness (based on conceptions of justice as rooted in altruism and equitable exchange18)
and care (based on psychological imperatives to avoid doing
harm to others19). These values serve to prosocial behavior outside of the context of group membership.
Conceptual schemas tend to become activated in contexts in
which they are relevant20,21. For example, the act of sitting behind
the wheel of a car is likely to make salient a variety of concepts
related to trafﬁc laws (stop at red) and vehicular operation (press
clutch to change gears). This helps the mind efﬁciently store and
process diverse swaths of information, since it would not be
helpful to be rehearsing automotive facts while, for instance,
attempting to prepare a pot of coffee22. In this way, the mental
system allows for the efﬁcient storage of information while
remaining able to recruit it in situations in which it may prove
useful23. Supporting this idea, research has shown that incidental
cues in people’s environment can activate mental representations
that subsequently impact people’s attitudes and behavior24–26.
This fact, combined with the idea that moral values serve to
regulate group behavior, leads to the possibility that people’s
moral values may be differently activated merely according to
whom they are with in the moment. Existing work supports the
idea that moral thinking may be impacted by subtle cues in
people’s environment. Research has shown, for example, that
reading the Ten Commandments or writing a story in morally
laden terms can strengthen people’s motivation to act morally27,
and other research has shown that activating different emotion
concepts can change prosocial behavior toward vulnerable social
targets28. Past research also demonstrates the power of social
context to impact moral behavior, including increasing
egalitarianism29, moralistic punishment30, and cooperation31.
More generally, classic research in psychology has shown how the
“mere presence” of others can cause meaningful shifts in people’s
attitudes and behavior32,33. This suggests that the presence of
others may affect the importance that people afford moral values.
If relational context does indeed inﬂuence moral thinking, then
close others may have a particularly pronounced effect. Research
shows that people feel heightened moral emotions toward close
2

versus distant others34, with corresponding impacts on evaluations and behavior35, including increased empathy36,
generosity37, leniency38, and respect39; other work shows that
people are more likely to cooperate with in-group (versus outgroup) members40. Furthermore, participation in group activities
can inspire prosocial emotions, including a sense of loyalty14 and
solidarity41, and close relationships foster an increased sense of
moral obligation42. And research has shown that increasing the
accessibility of close others affects the way people construe and
experience goals43. Thus close others may exert an especially
strong effect on the importance people afford moral values.
Individualizing values apply universally to all people, while
binding values tend to govern behavior in communities44,45.
Accordingly, the effect of close others on the importance people
afford moral values (hereafter termed “moral importance”) may
be more pronounced for binding than for individualizing values.
Corroborating this view, research has shown that binding and
individualizing values respond differently to different psychological cues. For example, abstract thinking, which tends to
emphasize objects’ universal properties46, increases people’s
preference for individualizing versus binding values47, suggesting
that the latter may be more “context sensitive”—that is, responsive to variations in people’s immediate social surroundings.
Overall, the reasoning outlined above leads to a set of predictions regarding the impact of social context on moral importance:
speciﬁcally, that being in the presence of close others will increase
the importance people afford binding, but not necessarily individualizing, foundations.
Testing how social context inﬂuences moral evaluation is
important for several reasons. First, scholars have long considered
morality the “social glue” that enables human cooperation.
Understanding how moral values are shaped by context may help
shed light on the cognitive processes that support this phenomenon. Second, this research may illuminate why people act in
ways that (seemingly hypocritically) countermand their stated
beliefs48. Consider a devoted husband who helps his wife destroy
evidence of a crime. While, in the abstract, he might consider
such behavior a violation of impartial justice, in the presence of
his wife, loyalty might supersede justice49. While past research
has proposed several possible explanations for this tendency48,49,
our research has the potential to introduce a new one—namely,
that certain moral values become “activated” in speciﬁc contexts,
leading people to behave in one circumstance in a way they may
not in another. Understanding how moral concerns ﬂuctuate
according to the social exigencies of the situation may thus
provide a new conceptual lens through which to understand
apparent inconsistencies in people’s moral behavior.
We conducted six studies to test how social context affects
moral importance. Study 1 used an app-based experience sampling approach to solicit from participants carrying out their daily
lives their views on the importance of various moral behaviors
and details on whom (if anyone) they were with. Study 2 consisted of a large-scale preregistered online survey with a novel set
of moral measures designed to provide convergent validity to the
initial ﬁndings and to obtain a more precise estimate of observed
effects. Study 3 was a laboratory-based experiment that randomly
assigned participants to either an “alone” or a “partner” condition, measured how close they felt to their partner, then assessed
their moral importance via the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire10. Study 4A consisted of a preregistered experiment in which we attempted to manipulate moral importance via
a manipulation of social closeness. In Studies 4B and 4C, we
successfully manipulated moral importance by randomly assigning people to imagine they were in the presence of a close versus
distant other. Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that people consider
binding values more important when in the presence of close
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others. All materials are available at https://osf.io/4q8jg/, all
analyses were conducted in R 4.1, and all hierarchical models
deﬁned in lme450. We report all primary and preregistered analyses, all data exclusions, and all conditions across all studies.
Results
Study 1 used an app-based experience-sampling approach to
investigate the association between people’s social context and
moral importance. We employed this approach because past
research has shown that experience-sampling strategies can provide insights into moral thinking and behavior that could not be
achieved through other methodologies51–53. We surveyed a large
sample of individuals and asked them to indicate whom they were
currently with, as well as the importance they afforded various
moral values, as they went about their daily lives (see “Methods”).
Then, using a separate sample, we collected estimates of the “social
closeness” of each of these relationship categories. We then tested
whether moral importance varied according to relational context.
Overall, we collected 13,123 evaluations of moral behavior at
1951 different timepoints. Of these, 1145 (58.7%) were collected
in the presence of another person. The most frequent type of
social context was being with a romantic partner (n = 316), a
child (n = 215), or a colleague or classmate (n = 138). The least
frequent contexts were clients (n = 13) and best friends (n = 19)
(For a complete list of relational context frequencies, see SOM
1.3.). No participants were excluded from the analysis.
First, we tested whether overall moral importance depended on
relational context by performing a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with relationship type as the primary predictor
and moral importance as the dependent variable, controlling for
age, gender, time of day, and day of the week (incidental variables), and setting participant as a random intercept. Results
showed a main effect of relationship type, F(4, 1608) = 5.74, p <
0.001, suggesting the moral importance varied according to
relational context. This effect was moderated by an interaction
with value type, F(4, 2891) = 2.68, p = 0.030, suggesting that the
effect of social context on moral importance differed depending
on whether people were rating binding or individualizing values.
Simple effects tests showed that binding values varied more
according to social context than did individualizing values, F(4,
3553) = 10.56, p < 0.001 versus F(4, 3016) = 5.93, p < 0.001.
To test how moral importance correlated with social closeness,
we asked a separate online sample (“Sample 2”, n = 94) to rate
how close, on average, they felt to members of each the relationship categories indicated by participants in the original
sample. We examined the association between the average moral
importance elicited in the original sample by each social context
and the average closeness scores obtained from Sample 2 for that
relationship. The model was a hierarchical linear model controlling for all incidental variables, with closeness as the primary
predictor and moral importance as the dependent variables, and
with participant and relationship type set as random effects.
Results showed a main effect of social closeness on moral
importance, B = 0.03, SE = 0.01, t(1750) = 4.38, p < 0.001, suggesting that people rated moral values more important the closer
they were to whomever they were with. To generate a simpliﬁed
understanding of these results, we computed an estimated moral
importance associated with each relationship by adding the
model intercept to the corresponding beta weight for each relationship and plotted it against the social closeness of that relationship obtained from Sample 2. Results showed a signiﬁcant
correlation, r(14) = 0.77, p = 0.001 (Fig. 1A), suggesting a positive association between the rated social closeness of each relationship type and the overall moral importance given by people in
that social context.
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Finally, we sought to test whether the relationship between
social closeness and moral importance varied according to value
type (binding versus individualizing). To do this, we centered
moral importance on the respective means of each value type,
then ran a linear model with the value type × closeness interaction
as the primary predictor and moral importance as the dependent
variable. Results showed a signiﬁcant interaction, B = 0.027, SE
= 0.014, t(3561) = 1.98, p = 0.048. Speciﬁcally, while both value
types were positively associated with social closeness, this effect
appeared to be stronger for binding values (B = 0.05, SE = 0.01, t
(3534) = 4.59, p < 0.001) than individualizing values (B = 0.02,
SE = 0.01, t(3531) = 2.00, p = 0.045; see Fig. 1B). This effect,
though small, was robust to the effects of people’s current
affective state (see SOM 1.1 and 1.2). Thus it appears that, while
being in the presence of close others is associated with increases
in the importance of both value types, this relationship is stronger
for binding than individualizing values.
Study 2 consisted of a large preregistered online sample that
would allow us to determine with greater precision the relationship between social closeness and moral importance. We recruited a total of 2016 participants and asked them to indicate whom,
if anyone, they were with. We then asked them two sets of
questions pertaining to the importance of moral values. The ﬁrst
was identical to those presented in Study 1 (termed the “moral
behavior” questions). The second consisted of a set of “decontextualized” moral values (termed the “moral value” questions),
which allowed us rule out the concern that the questions were
merely about social behavior (see “Methods”). We also collected
information on political orientation in order to help rule the
possibility that this was associated with the observed effects. In
addition, we collected two measures of social closeness: one from
an external sample; the other from participants themselves. In
this way we sought to show that the relationship between binding
importance and social closeness held across measures of morality
and for both internal and external ratings of social closeness. The
study was preregistered at AsPredicted.org; we report all preregistered analyses below.
Overall, 32% of the sample (N = 647) indicated they were in
the presence of others. Of these, the most frequent were romantic
partner (N = 313), child (188), and best friend (114). The sample
had a mean political orientation of 2.75 on a 1 (very liberal) to 5
(very conservative) scale, meaning that it leaned slightly liberal.
Each of the “moral behavior” items were closely correlated with
the “moral value” items (all ps < 0.001).
We sought to test the relationship between the moral importance of individualizing versus binding values and social closeness. There were two ways of doing this. The ﬁrst was to examine
the relationship between moral importance and the estimated
closeness ratings obtained from the separate sample; the second
to examine the relationship between moral importance and the
self-rated closeness of each relationship. The advantage of the ﬁrst
method is that it echoes the analysis strategy from Study 1 and
helps to rule out the possibility that any observed relationships
are the result of a correlation between people’s tendency to rate
moral values as important and others as close. The advantage of
the second is that it more closely reﬂects the relationship between
moral importance and people’s actual perceived closeness to the
person they were with. We report the results of each of these
analyses in turn.
Regression results showed that the relationship between estimated closeness and moral importance differed according to
value type, as revealed by signiﬁcant value type × closeness
interactions both for moral behavior, B = −0.12, SE = 0.01,
t(3531) = −16.10, p < 0.001, and moral values, B = −0.08, SE =
0.01, t(3513) = −12.56, p < 0.001. Closer inspection of the data
revealed that the importance of binding (B = 0.05, SE = 0.01, t
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Fig. 1 The relationship between moral importance and social closeness. A The estimated importance participants (n = 1166) in each relational context
afforded moral values plotted against the average social closeness of that relationship (obtained from a separate sample, n = 94). Black line shows the best
ﬁt line using ordinary least squares (OLS); ribbon = SEM; dot size reﬂects group size (range: 13—client to 806—alone). B The relationship between average
social closeness and moral importance of binding and individualizing values, with both value sets centered on their respective means. Ribbons = SEM.
**Slope signiﬁcant, B = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001; *Difference of slopes signiﬁcant, B = 0.027, SE = 0.014, p = 0.048. Source data are provided as a Source
data ﬁle.

(4287) = 6.84, p < 0.001) but not individualizing (B = −0.06, SE
= 0.01, t(4285) = −7.74, p < 0.001) behaviors was higher in the
presence of close others, as was the importance of binding (B =
0.04, SE = 0.01, t(4442) = 4.79, p < 0.001) but not individualizing
(B = −0.04, SE = 0.01, t(4442) = −5.75, p < 0.001) values.
We next examined the relationship between people’s ratings of
moral importance and self-rated closeness, controlling for age,
gender, political orientation, and mood. Results showed robust
interactions for both moral behavior (B = −0.11, SE = 0.01,
t(3530) = −16.58, p < 0.001) and moral values (B = −0.09, SE =
0.01, t(3512) = −14.72, p < 0.001). Speciﬁcally, we found that the
importance of binding behaviors (B = 0.07, SE = 0.01,
t(2729) = 8.05, p < 0.001) and values (B = 0.06, SE = 0.01,
t(2559) = 6.94, p < 0.001) was positively associated with social
closeness, while individualizing behaviors (B = −0.05, SE = 0.01,
t(2729) = −5.36, p < 0.001) and values (B = −0.03, SE = 0.01, t
(2559) = −3.66, p < 0.001) were not. Thus we ﬁnd across both
“moral behavior” and “moral value” question sets and for both
self-rated and estimated closeness that binding, but not individualizing, values increase in importance in the presence of close
others (see Fig. 2). In accordance with the preregistration, we also
examined the main effects of social context (being alone versus
being with others) on the overall importance of moral behavior
and values (i.e., collapsing across binding and individualizing
values). Results showed no signiﬁcant effect for moral behavior,
B = −0.52, SE = 0.68, t(1993) = −0.77, p = 0.44, but a negative
effect for moral values, B = −1.89, SE = 0.58, t(2718) = −3.25, p
= 0.001. This appears to be driven by the negative relationship
between social closeness and individualizing values, possible
explanations for which are discussed below.
Next, we tested whether moral importance varied according to
value type (binding versus individualizing) and relational context.
To do this, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with relationship
type, value type, and their interaction as the primary predictors
and moral importance as the dependent variable, controlling for
gender, age, political orientation, and mood (incidental variables).
We repeated the analysis for both moral behavio r and moral
values. The main effects of relationship type were marginally
signiﬁcant and not signiﬁcant for moral behaviors and values,
4

respectively, F(4, 4225) = 2.12, p = 0.076 and F(4, 3987) = 1.50,
p = 0.199—a fact that may be the result of opposite trends for
binding and individualizing values. Indeed, signiﬁcant relationship
type × value type interactions emerged for both moral behavior,
F(4, 3510) = 94.4, p < 0.001, and moral values F(4, 3499) = 57.43,
p < 0.001, suggesting that the association between relationship type
and moral importance differed according to value type.
Next, we tested the overall effect of social closeness (estimated
and self-rated) on the overall importance of moral behaviors and
values (i.e., collapsing across binding and individualizing values).
For estimated closeness, results showed no signiﬁcant effect on
moral values, B = −0.01, SE = 0.01, t(2718) = −1.44, p = 0.149,
and a negative effect on moral behavior, B = −0.01, SE = 0.01,
t(2713) = −1.83, p = 0.067. On the other hand, for self-rated
closeness, results showed a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between self-rated closeness for both moral behaviors, B = 0.01,
SE = 0.01, t(2713) = 1.99, p = 0.046, and moral values, B = 0.02,
SE = 0.01, t(2718) = 3.27, p = 0.001. These mixed results, which
are likely due to variations in the relative impact of binding versus
individualizing value sets, further support the idea that these
different value types are best considered separately (i.e., as an
interaction effect), as opposed to as a single category.
Study 3 consisted of a laboratory investigation that tested
whether moral values changed in importance depending on
manipulated social context. Participants were randomly assigned
to an “alone” versus a “partner” condition, then their moral
importance was assessed via the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire10, which, because it differed from the single-item
questions utilized in the previous two studies, offered the
opportunity to test the generalizability of these ﬁndings. As a
secondary analysis, we also asked participants how close they felt
to their partner, in order to investigate whether the effects were
moderated by perceived partner closeness. We also assessed and
controlled for political ideology and current affective state in
order to address the possibility that these factors accounted for
the observations. We then tested the data for the same pattern of
effects as that observed in Studies 1 and 2.
There were no condition-based differences in the degree to
which participants felt pressured to respond to the questions in a
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Fig. 2 Social closeness predicts the importance people afford binding versus individualizing values. The left two panels show the association between
moral importance rated by people in the presence of various social relationships (n = 2016) and the social closeness of those relationships estimated by a
separate sample (n = 110). The right two panels show the associations between moral importance and how close participants themselves felt to whomever
they were currently with. The upper two panels reﬂect ratings of the importance of moral behaviors; the lower panels the importance of moral values.
Alone participants were coded as having a social closeness of 0. Ribbons indicate SEM, and dots reﬂect individual ratings of moral importance, with sizes
scaled to reﬂect multiple values on the same point. Points with moral importance <30 (<5% of total sample) have been omitted for the visualization.
Source data are provided as a Source data ﬁle. *Differences between slopes signiﬁcant at p < 0.001.

particular way, t(388) = 1.11, p = 0.27 or judged for their
responses, t(388) = 0.65, p = 0.52, or in their current affective
state, t(375) = 1.32, p = 0.19. The average political orientation
was 2.3 on a 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative) scale (SD =
0.96). The mean level of partner closeness was 2.11, SD = 0.98.
We ﬁrst examined the effect of condition (alone versus partner)
on overall moral importance, controlling for age, gender, mood,
political afﬁliation, and non-moral evaluation (“incidental variables”, see “Methods”). Results showed no signiﬁcant effect, B =
0.02, SE = 0.06, t(689) = 0.38, p = 0.701. Next we tested the effect
of condition on binding versus individualizing values. Once again,
no signiﬁcant effect emerged, B = −0.09, SE = 0.08, t(346) =
−1.12, p = 0.262, and there was no simple effect of condition on
binding values, B = 0.07, SE = 0.06, t(683) = 1.18, p = 0.238.
Thus this study did not yield robust evidence that being in the
presence of another person versus being alone causes an increase
in the importance of binding values.
Because we did not obtain the results we had predicted, we
conducted a series of exploratory analyses to further understand

the phenomenon. We ﬁrst examined the frequency distribution of
the closeness measure. Results showed that only 59 participants
(32%) felt even “somewhat close” to their partner, suggesting a
failure of our manipulation of social closeness. Given that our
predictions suggested only people who felt close to their interaction partner would show an increase in the importance of
binding values, we reasoned that the low number of participants
in the former category might explain the absence of the predicted
effect.
To test this possibility, we re-analyzed the results with a focus
on the people who felt close to their partner. We split the participants in the “partner” condition into “distant” partner (n =
120) and “close partner” (n = 59) categories according to whether
they indicated they felt at least “somewhat close” to their partner
and treated these as separate conditions. We then conducted a 3
(social context: alone versus distant partner versus close partner) × 2 (value type: binding versus individualizing) mixed-model
ANOVA with moral importance as the dependent variable,
controlling for all incidental variables. We note this approach
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Fig. 3 The association between social context (alone, distant partner,
close partner) and moral importance according to value type. Binding
values were rated more important when participants were with a partner
they rated as close than when they were alone. Box centers reﬂect group
means; edges SEM; whiskers 95% CI (n = 390). Source data are provided
as a Source data ﬁle. *Difference between means signiﬁcant,
F(2, 340) = 3.69, p = 0.026.

cannot provide causal evidence as participants were categorized
according to closeness ratings they provided. As seen in Fig. 3, the
analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between value type and
social context, F(2, 345) = 4.02, p = 0.019. Speciﬁcally, binding
values (alone: M = 4.86, SD = 0.65; distant partner: M = 4.92, SD
= 0.64; close partner: M = 5.03, SD = 0.56) varied signiﬁcantly
with social context, F(2, 340) = 3.69, p = 0.026, but individualizing values did not (alone: M = 6.15, SD = 0.52; distant partner:
M = 6.20, SD = 0.57; close partner: M = 6.06, SD = 0.46), F(2,
340) = 1.63, p = 0.197. This interaction effect remained signiﬁcant even when additionally controlling for the effects of social
desirability (i.e., the degree to which participants said they felt
pressured to respond in a certain way to the questions, and the
degree to which they felt judged for their responses), F(2, 345) =
4.02, p = 0.019, suggesting that the effects are not due to the
effects of experimenter demand. Furthermore, a planned comparison of the importance of binding values among participants
who were alone versus those in the “close partner” condition
showed a signiﬁcant difference, t(107) = 2.09, p = 0.039; supporting the claim that people who were alone considered binding
values less important than those who rated their partner as close.
The results of the three previous studies were correlational. To
obtain causal evidence for our effect, in Study 4A we recruited
participants who said they were in the presence of another person. We then subjected them to a closeness manipulation: those
in the “close” condition were asked to write about ways in which
they felt close to the person or people they were with; those in the
“distant” condition were asked to write about ways in which they
felt distant or disconnected from the person or people they were
with. After the manipulation, participants responded to a
manipulation check that asked them how close they felt to
whomever they were with and ﬁnally responded to a series of
questions regarding the importance they afforded various moral
values. We reasoned that, by creating a sense of social closeness or
distance to whomever participants were currently with, we would
observe a corresponding shift in the importance of binding
values.
The most frequent social contexts were romantic partner (n =
809) and child (n = 423). Results showed the manipulation of
social closeness was successful, as those in the “close” condition
(M = 82.2, SD = 22.9) indicated feeling signiﬁcantly closer to
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whomever they were with than those in the distant (M = 72.6,
SD = 26.3), t(1948) = 8.65, p < 0.001. The primary hypothesis
consisted of a linear regression with condition as the primary
independent variable and binding importance as the dependent
variable, controlling for mood. Results showed no signiﬁcant
impact of condition on binding moral importance, B = −1.15, SE
= 0.84, t(1938) = −1.37, p = 0.169. Thus our preregistered
hypothesis was not conﬁrmed.
In exploratory analysis, we examined whether self-rated closeness was associated with individualizing versus binding
importance, controlling for age, gender, and mood. Once again,
we found a signiﬁcant value type × closeness interaction, B =
−0.08, SE = 0.02, t(1930) = −5.00, p < 0.001, suggesting that the
relationship between closeness and moral importance depended
on whether people were rating binding or individualizing foundations. Moreover, we observed that the association with closeness was stronger for binding value, B = 0.08, SE = 0.02,
t(1926) = 4.94, p < 0.001, than it was for individualizing ones, B
= 0.04, SE = 0.01, t(1925) = 3.48, p = 0.001, thereby once again
providing correlational, but not causal, support of our predictions
(see SOM 4.1).
In Study 4B, we developed an alternative manipulation of social
distance to provide causal evidence for the effect of social closeness on binding versus individualizing values. To do this, we
created an exercise that prompted participants to imagine they
were in the presence of a close versus distant other, after which
we solicited their views on moral importance on the same
0–100 scale that we used in Studies 1 and 2. Speciﬁcally, in the
“distant” condition, we asked participants to imagine they were
sitting on a bench next to a stranger, while in the “close” condition, we asked them to imagine sitting on a bench next to their
romantic partner. We selected these targets because they received
the lowest and highest ratings of social closeness in Study 1 (The
relationship of “mother” was rated slightly closer than romantic
partner in Study 2, but because this relationship carries general
connotations with “respect”, we opted for a relationship that does
not stack the deck so much in favor of the hypothesis.). This
imagination exercise has the potential advantage of not eliciting a
strong affective reaction to the close versus distant conditions,
thereby prohibiting mood from overcoming the effects, as well as
holding all situational elements constant by manipulating only
the identity of the imagined interaction partner.
As predicted, condition had no effect on mood, t(548) = 1.03,
p = 30. As indicated in the preregistration, the primary hypothesis consisted of a linear regression with condition as the primary
independent variable and binding importance as the dependent
variable, controlling for mood. Results showed a signiﬁcant
impact of condition on binding moral importance, B = 12.05, SE
= 1.76, t(540) = 6.86, p < 0.001, thus conﬁrming our preregistered
hypothesis. Next we examined whether condition had an effect on
individualizing importance, controlling for mood. It did, B =
3.75, SE = 1.58, t(542) = 2.36, p = 0.018. Moreover, the effect on
binding values was signiﬁcantly stronger than this effect, interaction B = −8.30, SE = 1.62, t(540) = −5.13, p < 0.001, thus
conﬁrming our prediction that binding values are more sensitive
to social closeness than individualizing.
One possible concern with this study is that it relies on speciﬁc
targets (stranger and romantic partner) to obtain its effect. While
we see no a priori reason to imagine that these particular targets
would yield the observed results in a different way than any other
close versus distant other, a more generalized test of the
hypotheses that does not rely on these speciﬁcs would lend
credibility and generalizability to the results. For this reason, we
conducted a ﬁnal experiment 4C to determine whether the mere
imagined presence of any close other is sufﬁcient to change the
importance of binding values.
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Fig. 4 The effect of imagining being in different social contexts and the importance afforded moral values. Each panel (n = 580 and n = 752,
respectively) shows the average rated importance of binding versus individualizing values when people are in the imagined presence of another person. A
Participants imagined being in the presence of a romantic partner or a stranger (Study 4B); B participants imagined being in the presence of someone
whom they do or do not “feel close to” (Study 4C). Box centers reﬂect group means; edges SEM; whiskers 95% CI. Source data are provided as a Source
data ﬁle. ***Difference between means signiﬁcant, A B = −8.30, SE = 1.62, t(540) = −5.13, p < 0.001; B B = −5.82, SE = 1.33, t(730) = −4.36, p < 0.001.

Study 4C was identical to Study 4B with the exception that,
instead of imagining sitting next to a “stranger” versus a
“romantic partner”, participants imagined sitting next to someone with whom they “feel close to” versus someone with whom
they “don’t feel close” to. As predicted, condition had no effect on
mood, t(734) = 1.26, p = 0.20. As indicated in the preregistration,
the primary hypothesis consisted of a linear regression with
condition as the primary independent variable and binding
importance as the dependent variable, controlling for mood. As
predicted, we found a signiﬁcant positive effect of an imagined
close (versus distant) other on binding moral importance, B =
11.08, SE = 1.47, t(727) = 7.55, p < 0.001.
Next we examined whether condition had an effect on individualizing importance, controlling for mood. It did, B = 5.15, SE
= 1.30, t(730) = 3.96, p < 0.001. However, the effect of binding
values was signiﬁcantly stronger, interaction B = −5.82, SE =
1.33, t(730) = −4.36, p < 0.001, thus conﬁrming our prediction
that binding values are more sensitive to social closeness than
individualizing values (see Fig. 4).
Discussion
Centuries of thought in moral philosophy suggest that the purpose of moral values is to regulate social behavior2,54. However,
the psychology underlying this process remains underspeciﬁed.
Here we show that the mere presence of close others increases the
importance people afford binding moral values. By contrast,
individualizing values are not reliably associated with relational
context. In other words, people appear to selectively activate those
moral values most relevant to their current social situation. This
“moral activation” may play a functional role by helping people to
abide by the relevant moral values in a given relational context
and monitor adherence to those values in others.
Our results are consistent with the view that different values
play different functional roles in social life. Past research contrasts
the values that encourage cohesion in groups and relationships
with those that emphasize individual rights and freedoms10.
Because violations to individualizing values may be considered

wrong regardless of where and when they occur, the importance
people ascribe to them may be unaffected by who they are with.
By contrast, because binding values concern the moral duties
conferred by speciﬁc social relationships, they may be particularly
subject to social inﬂuence.
Our ﬁndings converge with work highlighting the practical
contexts where binding values are pitted against individualizing
ones. Research on the psychology of whistleblowing, for
example, suggests that the decision over whether to report
unethical behavior in one’s own organization reﬂects a tradeoff
between loyalty (to one’s community) and fairness (to society in
general)55. Other research has found that increasing or
decreasing people’s “psychological distance” from a situation
affects the degree to which they apply binding versus individualizing principles44. For example, research shows that
prompting people to take a detached (versus immersed) perspective on their own actions renders them more likely to apply
impartial principles in punishing close others for moral
transgressions49. By contrast, inducing feelings of empathy
toward others (which could be construed as increasing feelings
of psychological closeness) increases people’s likelihood of
showing favoritism toward them in violation of general fairness
norms56. Our work highlights a psychological process that
might help to explain these patterns of behavior: people are
more prone to act according to binding values when they are
with close others precisely because that relational context
activates those values in the mind.
Our research is also broadly compatible with work on moral
identity theory41, which examines how people’s moral selfconcept impacts their moral judgments and decisions. For
example, this work has found that situational cues which increase
the mental accessibility of moral identity can subsequently
increase prosocial behavior24. Our work builds on this by suggesting that one type of situation that may activate certain moral
concepts is the presence of close others. Another ﬁnding from this
literature is that people with highly self-important moral identity
demonstrate a more expansive circle of moral regard toward outgroup members57. Building on this research, it would be fruitful
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in future research to test whether moral self-identity moderates
the effects we observed: perhaps people with such a self-concept
are less susceptible to the inﬂuence of close others because they
feel an extended sense of moral duty toward all humans.
This research adds to a growing body of work on how relational context impacts the activation and application of moral
principles5. Other research in this area has shown, for instance,
how judgments of different moral foundation violations vary
across relational contexts58, and how relationships may confer
different moral obligations59. More generally, scholars have
recently emphasized the importance of considering social context
when investigating the psychology of moral judgment and
evaluation60,61. The current research adds to this work by
showing just how sensitive moral evaluation can be to how close
people are to whomever they are with at the time.
Another implication of these results concerns the malleability
and consistency of moral values. Psychologists often treat moral
values as classic individual traits that consistently affect behavior
across many situations, and that change only slowly over the
course of a life span10,62. However, recent research on the contextual sensitivity of moral judgment and behavior has called this
character-based approach to morality into question63,64. The
current ﬁndings suggest one speciﬁc source giving rise to withinperson variability or “inconsistency” in morality, by suggesting
that, far from being immutable, certain moral values—in particular, binding values—may be ﬂexibly applied according to the
demands of the situation65.
Readers will note negative relationship between individualizing
values and social closeness in Study 2. This stands in contrast to
the results of Study 1, which showed a positive relationship
between these factors. This pattern is especially puzzling for the
questions concerning moral behavior, which were worded almost
identically to those of Study 1. One possible reason for this effect
is that the true relationship between individualizing values and
social closeness is close to 0, thus leading to apparent differences
in the direction due merely to random sampling effects. However,
the fact that the slopes differ signiﬁcantly from zero suggests that
there is more to the story. Another possible explanation for the
difference concerns the composition and nature of the two
samples (European smartphone users versus American Mechanical Turk users). Mechanical Turk workers, who typically complete survey on desktop computers, may be interacting with the
survey in a different manner than members of the European
smartphone sample. Determining how different cultures and
forms of media engagement can affect the importance people
afford moral values, while beyond the scope of the current project, will be an important topic for further research.
Study 4A found no evidence to support its preregistered
hypothesis, which was that people who were prompted to write
about ways in which they felt close to whomever they were with
would rate binding values as more important relative to those
prompted to write about ways they felt distant. One possible
explanation for this is that people do not in fact rate binding
values more important in the presence of close others, as we have
hypothesized in this paper. However, there are two other possible
explanations. The ﬁrst concerns the effect of mood. Exploratory
analyses suggested that condition had a strongly negative impact
on mood, t(1,1939) = 5.61, p < 0.001, doubtless a result of the fact
that half of participants were prompted to feel distant from the
people they were with (thereby leading them to feel negatively
overall). Because mood is likely to vary much more readily than
moral values, it is logical that the variations in mood would
“drown out” any effect on moral importance.
Another possibility is that there are “compensatory” factors at
play relating to the distance manipulation. When people are
prompted to think about ways they feel distant or disconnected
8

from the people they are with, they may simultaneously activate
binding values such as loyalty and respect that encourage them to
maintain social cohesion despite this distance. For example,
someone who writes about ways their child annoys them may also
be reminded of the importance of being loyal to one’s child
despite such relational perturbations. This might have the effect
of increasing the importance of binding foundations in the distant
condition as well, thus nullifying the effect. Another factor that
may have exacerbated this phenomenon is the fact that the
experiment was conducted during the coronavirus lockdown, a
time in which people’s proximity to close others would have
rendered maintaining positive relationships particularly important for their psychological wellbeing. Studies 4B and 4C helped
to answer these questions by using an imagined scenario that held
all variables constant except the perceived closeness of the
interaction partner.
Several new questions emerge on the basis of these ﬁndings.
First, it will be important to determine how alternate mappings of
the moral domain affect these results. For example, scholars have
argued that four moral motives—unity, hierarchy, equality, and
proportionality—may serve to regulate different relationships at
different times5. Other research distinguishes between personal
and impersonal forms of individualizing morality and includes
such concepts as self-control and industriousness, or a more
pluralistic conception of human morality, with ten or more discrete moral values60. Further research may fruitfully examine how
different relational contexts impact the importance of moral
values beyond the binding/individualizing dichotomy.
Future research could also investigate the way that speciﬁc
values (e.g., fairness, loyalty, purity, etc.) interact with speciﬁc
social contexts. For example, one might predict that values like
respect (but not necessarily loyalty) would come into play when
interacting with one’s corporate boss. Analyses presented in SOM
3.1 and 4.2-3 show that different speciﬁc values interact with
social distance in different ways across studies, suggesting that
there is more to the picture here than a simple activation of all
binding values uniformly. While our predictions concerned the
broad impact of close others on binding versus individualizing
values, it will be important in future work to specify more precisely which social conditions activate which particular values.
Next, the fact that we did not ﬁnd the predicted effect in Study
4A raises some questions that could fruitfully be explored in
subsequent work. We speculate that one possible reason why the
closeness manipulation did not affect moral importance is
because of compensatory processes that activate binding values in
response to a relationship being under threat. Exploring this
possibility, while beyond the scope of the current project, would
be a promising subject of future research.
Finally, we note that, while three different questionnaires were
used across the three studies in this paper, they all relied to some
degree on explicit (i.e., self-reported) measures of moral importance. While the various study approaches used render unlikely
the possibility that these effects would be the mere product of
experimenter demand, future research will beneﬁt from examining the extent to which these effects manifest via more implicit
measures, including through reaction time or priming behavior.
Understanding the degree to which social context can inﬂuence
the implicit processing of moral information represents a promising domain of future work.
In sum, we ﬁnd that what people value depends on whom they
are with at a given moment. Speciﬁcally, people ascribe more
importance to binding values when they are in the presence of
close others, while the importance of individualizing values does
not reliably change according to who is beside them. This is
consistent with past theory suggesting that morality helps to
regulate social relationships, and it suggests that different moral
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values may be selectively activated according to the demands of
the social situation.
Methods

Study 1, participants and method. The research was part of the “58s” project
investigating the everyday life of European adults66, approved by The Ethics
Committee of ESADE Business School, Spain, approval number 005/2019. Upon
signing up for and providing consent to participate in the study, participants (N =
1166, Mage = 35.7, SD = 11.1, 861 females, 305 males) provided demographic
information, including their age and gender. They were then contacted at random
points over the next several months and asked to respond to a series of questions
(pulled from a larger pool). No participants were excluded from the analysis.
Social context was assessed by asking participants whom they were currently
with and then providing them a list of fourteen possible categories and asked to
pick the one that best reﬂected their relationship to the person they were with (e.g.,
stranger, best friend, romantic partner). For analyses involving between-group
ANOVAs, in order to avoid overly small group sizes (i.e., n client = 13; best friend
= 19) we categorized the relationships into ﬁve relationship types (alone, family,
friends, professional, and other). Overall moral importance was assessed by
averaging across responses on how important it was for participants in that
moment to behave in accordance with each of ﬁve moral values10 (care, fairness,
loyalty, authority, and purity; 0—Not at all important; 100—Very important). The
importance of “binding” values was assessed by averaging the loyalty, purity, and
authority; the importance of “individualizing” values was assessed by averaging
care and fairness. In addition, to assess current affective state, at approximately
75% of the timepoints, participants were also presented a question asking them to
indicate how happy they felt (0—Not at all; 100—Very).
The analytic approach consisted of a series of multilevel analyses controlling for
participants’ age and gender, hour of day, and day of week, with participant-level
random intercepts (incidental variables).
Estimated closeness. To an estimate of the average closeness of each of the relationships presented, we recruited a separate sample of participants on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (N = 94, Mage = 36.4, SD = 1.4, 54 female, 40 male) and presented them with a complete randomized list of the relationship categories we had
provided to participants in the experience sample. We then provided the following
instructions:
Please use the slider to indicate how socially close that relationship is. It
does not matter if that person exists in your own life; just indicate, for each
relationship, how close that relationship is on average. (0—Not at all close
to 100—Extremely close).
Mean social closeness scores were computed by averaging the closeness ratings
for each relationship, with “alone” coded as 0.
Materials (translated from the French). Social context: Who are you with?
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Alone
Romantic partner
Child
Client
Colleague or classmate
Mother
Father
Friend
Extended family
Acquaintance
Sister
Brother
Best friend
Stranger

= 36.9, SD = 11.8, 954 males, 1038 females, 24 other/ﬂuid), who participated
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk via TurkPrime67 for compensation of 20¢.
Questions for this and all subsequent surveys were administered through Qualtrics
Versions 2019–2021.
Procedure. After providing consent, participants answered the same ﬁve moral
importance questions that they responded to in Study 1, presented in random
order (e.g., “How important is it to you to act in a manner that is faithful and
loyal?”). We term these the “moral behavior” questions. Next, participants
answered a series of ﬁve questions in the following format: “Please rate the overall
importance of each of the following values” (0—Not at all important to 100—
Extremely important) and then simply listed the value. The target values were
“Fairness”, “Loyalty”, “Respect”, “Purity/Sanctity”, and “Care/Kindness”. The
purpose of this abstract question format was to ensure we had a measure of moral
importance that was completely removed from any intrinsic social connotations
and could thus be subject to concerns about the inherently social nature of the
morality questions (We term these the “moral value” questions.).
Self-rated closeness: Next, participants indicated whether they were currently in
the presence of other people and, if so, reported who by selecting any number of
boxes corresponding to the different types of social relationships. We expanded the
number of relationship types from 14 (in Study 1) to 17 (adding “boss”, separating
“colleague” and “classmate” into two separate responses, and adding “other”) in
order to provide more precision in our analyses (see “Materials”). Then, on the
following screen, participants were asked “How close do you currently feel to
your…” and each of the selections they had made on the previous screen were
piped in so as to provide them an opportunity to indicate their self-rated closeness
to each of the people in question.
Finally, participants reported their current affective state (0—Very negative to
100—Very positive), whether they felt pressured to answer in any particular way (1
—Not at all to 5—Extremely), their age, gender, and their political orientation (1—
Very liberal to 5—Very conservative).
The analysis consisted of a multilevel regression with participant set as a
random factor in order to account for the fact that some participants were in the
presence of multiple others at the same time, controlling for gender, age, political
orientation, mood, and non-moral evaluation.
Estimated closeness: In order to obtain an additional estimate of the closeness of
the various social contexts that people were in, we recruited a sample of 110
participants (60 males, 45 females, 5 other, Mage = 36.2, SD = 11.4) through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and asked them to indicate how “close on average” was
each relationship in the list of 17 presented to the primary sample, with the
exception of “other” and “alone” (since these did not make sense in this context).
Materials. Social context: Are you currently in the company of other people? (Yes/
No)
●

[If yes]: Who?
Romantic partner
Child
Client
Colleague
Classmate
Mother
Father
Friend
Extended family
Acquaintance
Sister
Brother
Best friend
Stranger
Boss
Other

Moral values: (0—Not at all to 100—Completely):
●
●
●
●
●

How
How
How
How
How

important
important
important
important
important

is
is
is
is
is

it
it
it
it
it

to
to
to
to
to

you
you
you
you
you

to
to
to
to
to

act in a manner that is decent or pure?
avoid doing harm to others?
act in a manner that is honest and just?
act in a manner that is faithful and loyal?
respect hierarchy and authority?

Study 2, participants. The research was approved by the Institutional Review
Board, University of Pennsylvania, Protocol #834222. The study was preregistered
at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=6sw3tn. Our power analysis was based on
the overall main effect of the presence of others on moral importance in Study 1,
with an approximate effect size of d = 0.15 (a very small effect). A power analysis
conducted in G*Power suggested a required sample size of 1870 (power = 90%).
To be conservative, we aimed to collect a sample of about 2000. No participants
were excluded from the analysis, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 2016 participants (Mage

Study 3, participants. The research was approved by the Institutional Review
Board, University of Pennsylvania, Protocol #834222. This study was implemented
at the University of Pennsylvania with undergraduates as participants. The overall
purpose of the study was to determine whether the importance people afforded
moral values depended on whether they were with another person and how close
they felt to that person. Thus, we planned to randomly assign participants to either
the “alone” or the “partner” condition and then measure people’s sense of social
closeness to their partner. Because the social context that people were going to be in
in the “partner” condition was that of “colleague/classmate”, we based our power
analysis off the analogous results in Study 1. Probing the difference in moral
importance for people in this category (versus alone) yielded an effect size of about
d = 0.2 (a small effect). Because the laboratory-based nature of the study allowed us
to reduce additional variance introduced by other contextual differences (e.g.,
differences in the environment in which the questions were answered), we estimated an effect size of d = 0.3. A power analysis in G*Power suggested that a
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minimum sample size of 278 is required to detect an effect of this size (power =
80%, one-tailed); we sought to oversample in order to maximize our changes of
detecting an effect.
Overall, a total of 404 participants ended up registering to participate in the
study, advertised as “Who Do You Think You Are?” via an online recruitment tool
(SONA), in exchange for course credit. Of these, we excluded four participants for
failing to follow instructions, four for failing an attention check, and six
participants who knew experimenter beforehand, since a relationship between the
participant and the experimenter introduced the possibility that a sense of being in
a social situation would be activated even among participants who were in the
“alone” condition. The resulting sample consisted of 390 participants (Mage = 19.8,
SD = 1.2, 267 females, 122 males, 1 other/ﬂuid).

3. What is something you have always wanted to do but probably never will be
able to do?
4. If you could travel anywhere in the world, where would you go and why?
Question Set 3

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned beforehand to participate in the
study either alone or with a partner by means of being given the opportunity to
sign up for time slots with either one or two availabilities per slot. Participants were
greeted at a waiting area by the experimenter, who informed them they would be
answering some questions about their beliefs and opinions. The experimenter led
them to an experiment room in which there were two computers on two opposing
desks. The desks were arranged such that participants sitting at them would be
facing each other but would be unable to view each other’s responses. The purpose
of this was to heighten the sense of being in the presence of another person while
mitigating the possibility that people would feel that they were being judged for
their responses.
The experimenter informed participants that they would begin by completing a
“Getting To Know You” task. The intention of this task was to increase feelings of
personal closeness through disclosure of personal information68. After providing
consent, participants were handed a piece of paper with three question sets. Each
question set consisted of four personal questions (e.g., “What are some of your
hobbies?” and “If you could travel anywhere in the world, where would you go and
why?”; see “Materials”). Participants in both conditions were instructed to
complete the ﬁrst two question sets, but not the third, which would be completed at
the end of the study. The purpose of leaving the third question set unanswered was
to promote the belief among participants in the “partner” condition that the social
interaction had not yet concluded, thereby increasing people’s sense that they were
engaged in a social interaction. Participants in the “partner” condition were
instructed to take turn asking each other the questions and write down their
partner’s responses on their own paper. Participants in the “alone” condition were
instructed to provide their own responses to the questions and write them down on
the paper.
After participants completed the ﬁrst two question sets, they were instructed to
notify the experimenter, who then instructed them to complete a set of questions
on the computer screen. First, as a measure of social closeness, they indicated how
close they felt to their partner (1—Not at all close to 5—Very close). Then they
responded to the primary set of questions, which consisted of the 30 items
comprising the “Moral Values Questionnaire” (MFQ). In accordance with past
theory, the MFQ is designed to assess the importance that people ascribe to each of
ﬁve moral values. The questionnaire also includes measures of non-moral
evaluation (e.g., the importance of being good at math; the importance of having a
good time) to be used as controls to ensure that moral importance did not just
reﬂect people’s tendency to rate all preferences (even non-moral ones) as
important. In addition, participants provided a variety of demographic
information, including age, gender, affective state (1—Not at all happy to 100—
Very happy), and political afﬁliation (1—Very liberal to 5—Very conservative). In
order to control for social desirability, participants indicated the degree to which
they felt pressured to respond in a particular way to the questions (1—Not at all to
5—Very much so) and judged for their responses (1—Not at all to 5—Very much
so). After completing the questions on the computer survey, participants were
instructed to notify the experimenter, at which point they were debriefed and
dismissed.

Study 4A, participants. The research was approved by the Institutional Review
Board, University of Pennsylvania, Protocol #834222. The study was preregistered
at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=fr9fd3. Our power analysis was based on
pretesting that suggested an approximate effect size of 0.1 < d < 0.2. A power
analysis conducted in G*Power suggested that a required sample size of about 2000
(power = 90%) would be capable of detecting an effect size of d = 0.14. We only
included for analysis participants who passed an attention check (how many fatal
heart attacks they had had in their life), were not using a proxy server or VPN, and
were in the presence of others. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 2031 (Mage = 32.2, SD
= 11.7, 867 males, 1050 females, 26 other/ﬂuid, 88 missing), who participated
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk via TurkPrime67 for compensation of 50¢.

Analytic approach. The primary analysis consisted of a regression model with
moral importance as the dependent variable, controlling for age, gender, affective
state, the importance of the non-moral items, and political afﬁliation. The primary
predictors were value type and social closeness, operationalized both as a
manipulated factor (partner versus alone) and partner closeness (close versus
distant). We predicted that people who felt close to their partner would rate
binding values more important than those who were alone, and that this effect
would differ from the effect of partner closeness on the importance of individualizing values.

Study 4B, participants. The research was approved by the Human Research
Protections Program at the Institutional Review Board, University of Pennsylvania,
Protocol #834222. The study was preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/blind.
php?x=f9796m. Our power analysis was based on pretesting that suggested an
approximate effect size of d = 0.3. A power analysis conducted in G*Power suggested a required sample size of about 580 (power = 95%); we sought 600 to be
conservative. We only included for analysis participants who passed an attention
check (how many fatal heart attacks they had had in their life) and were not using a
proxy server or VPN. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 580 participants (Mage = 32.5,
SD = 11.5, 211 males, 367 females, 2 other/ﬂuid), who participated through Proliﬁc
for compensation of 25¢.

Materials. Getting-to-Know-You Questions:
Question Set 1
1. What is your ﬁrst name?
2. Where are you from?
3. What is a food you really enjoy?
4. What do you like the most about Philadelphia? What do you hate the most?
Question Set 2
1. What are some of your hobbies?
2. What would you like to do with your life in the next 5 years?
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1. What is your happiest early childhood memory?
2. Describe the last time you felt lonely.
3. What is one recent accomplishment that you are proud of?
4. What is one of your biggest fears?
Moral Values Questionnaire: The wording for the MVQ can be found at https://
moralvalues.org/questionnaires/.

Procedure. After consenting to participate, participants were asked who, if anyone,
they were with. Next, they were randomly assigned to the “close” or the “distant”
condition, in which they were prompted to write at least 50 characters describing
ways in which they felt close to or distant from the people they were with. Next,
participants responded to a manipulation check asking them how close they felt to
the people they were currently with. Then they were asked how important were the
following values (in randomized order): “Respect authority” (authority) “Be loyal”
(loyalty), and “Behave decently” (purity); then “Avoid doing harm” (harm) and
“Act fairly” (fairness). Next, they indicated their demographic information, mood,
and were asked what they thought the study was about.
The preregistered analysis consisted of a linear regression with the averaged
importance of the three binding foundations (purity, loyalty, and authority) as the
dependent variable and condition as the independent variable, controlling
for mood.
Materials. Social closeness manipulation: Participants in the close condition were
provided the following instructions:
Please describe some ways in which you feel close or connected to the
person or people you’re with. You may write about things you have in
common with them, things you love about them, or a speciﬁc time in
which you felt particularly connected to them. Remember your response is
completely conﬁdential and anonymous. You must spend at least 30 s on
this page and write at least 50 characters.
Participants in the distant condition were provided the following instructions:
Please describe some ways in which you feel distant or disconnected from
the person or people you’re with. You may write about ways in which you
are different from them, things you don’t like about them, or a speciﬁc
time in which you felt particularly disconnected from them. Remember
your response is completely conﬁdential and anonymous. You must spend
at least 30 s on this page and write at least 50 characters.

Procedure. After consenting to participate and passing the attention check, participants were asked to imagine they were sitting on a bench next to a stranger or a
romantic partner. They were then asked to indicate, in randomized order, how
important all ﬁve values were to them (as in previous studies). They then provided
demographic information, were probed for suspicion, and debriefed. Thirteen
participants (2%) expressed some indication that they understood the hypothesis
behind the study; all analyses stand when excluding these participants from
analysis.
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Materials. Distance manipulation: Imagine you are sitting on a bench next to a
stranger. How important in that moment would each of the following moral values
be to you?
Closeness manipulation: Imagine you are sitting on a bench next to your
romantic partner. How important in that moment would each of the following
moral values be to you?
Study 4C, participants. The research was approved by the Institutional Review
Board, University of Pennsylvania, Protocol #834222. The study was preregistered
at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=f9796m. For this preregistered study, our
power analysis was based on pretesting that suggested an approximate effect size of
d = 0.25. A power analysis conducted in G*Power suggested a required sample size
of about 800 (power = 95%). We only included for analysis participants who
passed an attention check (how many fatal heart attacks they had had in their life)
and were not using a proxy server or VPN. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 752
participants (Mage = 33.2, SD = 12.5, 272 males, 479 females, 1 other/ﬂuid), who
participated through Proliﬁc for compensation of 25¢.
Procedure. After consenting to participate and passing the attention check, participants were asked to imagine they were sitting on a bench next to someone they
“feel close to” or “don’t feel close to”. They were then asked to indicate, in randomized order, how important all ﬁve values were to them (as in previous studies).
They then provided demographic information, were probed for suspicion, and
debriefed.
Materials. Distance manipulation: Imagine you are sitting on a bench next to
someone you don’t feel close to. How important in that moment would each of the
following moral values be to you?
Closeness manipulation: Imagine you are sitting on a bench next to someone
you feel close to. How important in that moment would each of the following
moral values be to you?
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability
The datasets generated for the current study are available in the Open Science
Framework repository, https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/4Q8JG. Source data are
provided with this paper.
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